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Few historians would doubt the huge influence of the metanarratives of “nation”
and “class” on nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. Both had risen to promi-
nence in the midst of the massive upheaval that followed nineteenth-century indus-
trialization. Both were hugely successful defensive mechanisms promising stable
identities and continuity in a rapidly changing world. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the nascent European labour movements began to build their politi-
cal claims on the language of “class”, while being shaped to a considerable extent
by their respective national frameworks. The tension between this “national”
framework and the more international aspirations of the language of class was
present from the beginning of the modern labour movement. Examples from Britain
and Germany show how organized labour constructed identities that attempted to
reconcile the languages of these seemingly antagonistic concepts.
Peu d’historiens douteraient de l’énorme influence qu’ont eue les métanarratifs de
« nation » et de « classe » sur l’histoire du XIXe et du XXe siècles. Tous deux avaient
atteint la prééminence lors des bouleversements consécutifs à l’industrialisation du
XIXe siècle. Tous deux ont remporté énormément de succès comme mécanismes de
défense, promettant des identités stables et la continuité dans un monde évoluant
rapidement. Durant la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, les mouvements ouvriers
naissants d’Europe commencèrent à revendiquer la langue des « classes » sur la
scène politique tout en étant façonnés dans une large mesure par leurs cadres
nationaux respectifs. La tension entre ce cadre « national » et les aspirations plus
internationales de la langue des classes était présente dès le début du mouvement
ouvrier moderne. Des exemples de Grande-Bretagne et d’Allemagne montrent com-
ment le travail organisé a construit des identités qui tentaient de concilier les
langues de ces concepts en apparence contradictoires.
* Stefan Berger is professor of history at the University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd, Great Britain. He is
author of three works and numerous articles as well as co-editor of several volumes in the areas of
comparative labour history, historiography, and national identity.
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FEW HISTORIANS would doubt the huge influence of the metanarratives
of nation and class on nineteenth- and twentieth-century history. Both
had risen to prominence (if not dominance) in the midst of the massive
upheaval which followed in the wake of nineteenth-century industrializa-
tion. Both were hugely successful defensive mechanisms promising stable
identities and continuity in a rapidly changing world. In the second half of
the nineteenth century, the nascent European labour movements began to
build their political claims on the language of class, although the older lan-
guage of the people often survived and merged with the new discourse of
class in a variety of ways. At the same time, labour movements across
Europe acted within national frameworks which came to shape their outlook
to a considerable extent.
The tension between this national framework and the more international
aspirations of the language of class was present right from the beginning of
the modern labour movement. How did organized Labour construct identities
that attempted to reconcile the languages of nation and class? Which difficul-
ties did it encounter with those attempts? Finally, how did the languages of
class and nation end up as seemingly antagonistic concepts? Those are the
three questions that I wish to explore, mainly with relation to the British and
German examples. Furthermore, in both countries the working classes were
badly divided by strong ethnic identities that also affected the outlook of the
labour movement. The relationship between class and ethnic identities is dis-
cussed with particular reference to Étienne Balibars terms class racism and
self-racialisation. The institutional racialisation of manual labour was
closely intertwined with the self-racialisation of the working class, which
was to have important consequences for the relationship between indigenous
workers in Britain and Germany and those perceived as foreign.1
In the course of the nineteenth century, the language of the nation became
increasingly the property of the political right.2 At the end of the eighteenth
century, the idea of the nation had been tied firmly to an emancipatory
agenda. In the American and French revolutions of the 1770s and 1780s in
particular, it was primarily an anti-absolutist weapon. It stood for freedom,
citizenship, and mass political participation. Liberal nationalism became a
beacon of hope for those social groups marginalized and excluded from the
centres of political power. Yet with the emergence of more conservative,
integral nationalisms in the second half of the nineteenth century, nation-
states emphasized exclusionary policies, especially against immigrants and
national minorities, which excluded those groups from access to social wel-
fare and citizenship rights. National and ethnic issues became increasingly
1 Étienne Balibar, Class Racism, in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambigu-
ous Identities (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 204216.
2 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist
and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality, in Michael Mann, ed., The Rise and Decline
of the Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 210226.
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intertwined, and the national idea became tied to Social Darwinian notions
of the survival of the fittest. The language of the nation, as spoken by the
political right, was explicitly non-inclusive. It fed on the delineation of strict
boundaries: ethnic, gender, and class boundaries in particular. Liberal
nationalism had, of course, never been entirely free of those borders. After
all, even liberal nationalists rarely envisaged workers, or for that matter
women, as equal partners in the nation. Their visions of national communi-
ties consisted by and large of communities of male, educated, well-to-do
individuals sharing the same cultural code. Yet the theoretical universalism
of liberal nationalism was abandoned by integral nationalism in favour of the
open celebration of exclusionary mechanisms that left large sections of the
population out in the cold.
By constructing the nation as mirror opposite to the concept of class, inte-
gral nationalism also attempted to force upon the young labour movement the
stigma of anti-nationalism. Yet large sections of the left never accepted any
straightforward dichotomy between the ideas of nation and class. Many
labour movements the world over perceived themselves as heirs to liberal
nationalism, championing the idea of a good progressive patriotism that was
juxtaposed to a bad reactionary nationalism. For many nineteenth-century
socialists, including Marx, the nation was a necessary step on the road to
socialism.3 The unified nation-state made sense economically, and it was on
its territory that the ultimate liberation of the working class would take place.
The class identities propagated by Labour were not opposed to national iden-
tities; they often complemented each other. After all, as Eric Hobsbawm
famously remarked: Men and women did not choose collective identification
as they chose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a time.4
Hence, many labour movements attempted to invoke the languages of
nation and class at one and the same time, in both their political practice
and their theory. Thus, in the early twentieth century, the Australian Labour
Party played a key role in constructing the meaning of the nation, tying it
firmly to notions of the welfare state, tariff reform, and racialist White Aus-
tralia policies.5 In the United States, Labour republicanism vigorously
defended the American standard combining national sentiment with dem-
ocratic principle, a critique of monopoly power and demands for trade union
rights as well as market regulation.6 Left-wing populist republicanism in
France frequently invoked the French revolution as an important reference
3 I. Cummins, Marx, Engels and National Movements (London: Croom Helm, 1980).
4 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (London: Verso, 1990), p. 123.
5 David W. Lovell, Australian Socialism to 1917: A Study of the Relations Between Socialism and
Nationalism, Australian Journal of Politics and History, special issue no. 40 (1994), pp. 144159;
John Murphy, Populism and Democracy: A Reading of Australian Radical Nationalism, Thesis
Eleven, vol. 16 (1987), pp. 8599.
6 Neville Kirk, The Working Class in the United States: Between Radical Republicanism and the
American Standard , in Stefan Berger and Angel Smith, eds., Nationalism, Labour and Ethnicity,
1870–1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 164192.
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point for specifically left-wing notions of la patrie.7 In India, important sec-
tions of the labour movement supported the nationalist campaigns of the
1920s and 1930s because they could tie demands for a nation-state to
demands for higher wages and better working conditions.8 Furthermore,
some of the most prominent theoreticians of the Social Democratic and
Communist left realized the importance of national identity and wrote about
it at length. Eduard Bernstein, Otto Bauer, V. I. Lenin, and Rudolf Rocker, to
mention but a few, all paid considerable attention to the national question
and came up with a wide variety of answers as to how national identities
could best be reconciled with class identities.9
The period between the 1870s and the 1930s was crucial for the co-option
of Labour into many European nation-states. Such co-option was often
based on complex negotiations and intricate compromise. Class and national
identities were often compatible, although such compatibility could some-
times be of a precarious nature. One of the biggest problems of the left was
to delineate a progressive Labour nationalism from the various right-wing
nationalisms that Labour opposed. It seems particularly appropriate to
choose the British and German labour movements to illustrate the difficul-
ties involved in this exercise, as they are widely regarded as being on oppo-
site ends of the wide spectrum of possible relationships between Labour and
nationalism. Britain is often seen as one of those countries (Australia, the
United States, and France would be other examples) where a liberal national
heritage remained dominant. Labour, thus goes the argument, found it rela-
tively easy to buy into this heritage. By contrast, in Germany the decisive
break with liberal nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century
meant that Social Democracy found it more and more difficult to carve out a
niche within the existing concepts of the nation-state. Social Democrats
were thus forced to develop an alternative oppositional nationalism, that is
to champion concepts of the nation distinct from and often in opposition to
the dominant concepts of the nation championed by other political forces.
Furthermore, where the national discourse in Britain is assumed to have
been relatively homogeneous and stable, in Germany the manifold political
ruptures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ensured a multiplicity of
competing national discourses, many of which proved mutually incompati-
ble.10 In what follows I challenge briefly those comparisons that juxtapose
assumptions about a reasonably unproblematic integration of British Labour
7 Brian Jenkins, Nationalism in France: Class and Nation Since 1789 (London: Routledge, 1980).
8 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in
India, 1850–1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
9 See, more recently, Michael Forman, Nationalism and the International Labour Movement: The Idea
of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1998).
10 The classic case of contrasting British and German Labours experiences with and subsequent attitude
to the nation-state is John Schwarzmantel, Socialism and the Idea of the Nation (London: Harvester
and Wheatsheaf, 1991).
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with notions of an almost complete exclusion of the German labour move-
ment from the nation-state.
Anti-socialism was a prominent feature of German and British society in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Social Democrats in Impe-
rial Germany (SPD) were widely denounced as fellows without a father-
land and excluded from respectable bourgeois society. The Protestant and
Catholic churches (the latter with considerable more success than the
former) attempted to inculcate in their flocks religious sentiments which
were supposed to work as a bulwark against socialism. With many Protestant
ministers, religion and nationalism were in fact two sides of the same coin.
The Imperial German state heavily recruited the educational system in its
battle against Social Democracy. The Imperial German armies were widely
perceived as school of the nation, with Social Democrats systematically
excluded from veterans organizations from the 1880s onwards. Social
Democrats in the Kaiserreich faced police harassment, unfair imprisonment,
and dubious legal proceedings. However, even in the darkest years of the
Anti-Socialist Laws (18781890), the repression of Social Democrats
always had its limits in the rule of law. Bismarckian welfare reforms
attempted unsuccessfully to wean workers away from Social Democracy.
Powerful German employers could afford to keep socialist unions out of the
workshops before 1914, and they largely financed vociferous anti-socialist
organizations such as the Imperial League against Social Democracy. If
many leading Social Democrats perceived parliament as the holy grail of
peoples sovereignty, the partys work in parliament was made difficult by its
inability to find political allies. The SPD faced deep hostility from the Con-
servatives and National Liberals, whereas the small number of left liberals
who favoured cooperation with the SPD did not make much difference:
Social Democrats remained excluded from power at the national level of
politics in Imperial Germany, and many well-functioning anti-socialist alli-
ances in the German states and municipalities ensured that, even if the SPD
was often the strongest party, it was kept at arms length from exercising
power.
All this clearly amounts to a good deal of exclusion from the nation-state.
However, the picture in Britain does not really look a great deal better.
Christianity was arguably more important to British than to German social-
ism, but the high politicization of the churches in the second half of the nine-
teenth century meant that the Labour Party had nowhere to turn for support.
As in Germany, British schools were widely used to implant nationalism into
the minds of children and youth. Militarism undoubtedly pervaded British
civilian life to a lesser extent than was the case in Germany. The absence of
compulsory military service clearly mattered. Nevertheless, in the 1900s
about 22 per cent of all British men aged between 17 and 40 had some expe-
rience of military life. Perhaps more importantly, many workers encountered
the army only during periods of extensive industrial conflict when it
appeared to side with the employers. The police in Britain were widely per-
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ceived by workers as an instrument of class rule, and the British judiciary
based many of its controversial rulings at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury on its firm belief that repressive controls needed to be enforced upon the
labour movement. Britain, like Germany, was a pioneer of the modern wel-
fare state, and we can observe similar attempts to establish, through social
welfare, a kind of state control over large areas of working-class life. In Brit-
ain anti-socialists such as the Anti-Socialist Union also relied upon the gen-
erous support of business. Yet employers were not strong enough to keep
unions at the gates of factories and workshops. However, as many of those
unions were non-socialist, arguably there was less of a threat emanating
from them. Ultimately, both British and German employers clearly followed
strategies that aimed to pacify industrial conflict. British Labours parlia-
mentary road to socialism has been minutely documented,11 but the party
undoubtedly also faced considerable hostility from Conservatives and Liber-
als alike.
Between the 1880s and the 1920s, despite the manifold exclusionary prac-
tices, both Britain and Germany witnessed an increasing, albeit always con-
tested, integration into the mainstream of the nation-state. Initial hostility
and non-cooperation gave way to an increasing recognition that political par-
ties representing millions of people could not simply be ignored in the age of
mass politics. Social reform measures were introduced by Otto von Bis-
marck and David Lloyd-George before 1914 in an attempt to contribute to
the solution of the social question. While social reform cannot be reduced
to efforts to stem the rise of socialism in both countries, the rise of the wel-
fare state did give workers organizations an increasing stake in the nation-
state. The official nationalism propagated by the state apparatus in both Brit-
ain and Germany had an important impact on the labour movement. Wide
sections of British Labour adopted the prevalent imperialist and monarchist
discourses and came to perceive themselves as representatives of a British
nation. As such, many Labour leaders remained wary of anything that
smacked of Celtic nationalism or devolution. In Germany, Social Demo-
cratic republicanism could be shot through with considerable doses of mon-
archism, and the partys colonial experts Gustav Noske and Eduard
Bernstein represented ideas of a benign colonialism which was to educate
and civilise the native population rather than exploit and repress it. British
Labour leaders could be proud of the glorious traditions of parliamentarism
in their country, just as German Social Democrats were identifying with the
legacy of 1848 and upholding notions of the rule of law. They castigated the
Imperial German authorities for not adhering to those rules and for attempt-
ing to bend them wherever possible, but the Social Democrats actions in
parliament left no doubt: far from using the Reichstag as a mere propaganda
platform to propagate the aim of revolution and the overthrow of capitalism,
Social Democratic parliamentarians worked hard for the implementation of
11 See especially Ralph Milibands classic Parliamentary Socialism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961).
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practical reforms that would make Imperial Germany a more democratic and
a more socially just society. In Britain, as James Hinton has emphasized, a
strong tradition of Labour voluntarism, which relied on working-class
associational culture rather than the state, became increasingly overshad-
owed in the twentieth century by a parallel tradition of Labour Jacobinism,
which attempted to construct citizenship in a positive relationship between
working-class organisations and a powerful, transforming state.12 Ulti-
mately both labour movements felt alienated from the nation-state, and yet,
at the same time, both increasingly felt that they had a stake in the nation,
that they belonged to and even best represented the community of people
making up the nation. In fact, Marcel van der Linden, comparing the atti-
tudes of different European working-class parties towards the nation-state,
found the British and German parties identifying relatively strongly with
their respective nation-states.13
If what we witness in the first three decades of the twentieth century
amounts to slow, if uneven, integration, one would expect an increasingly
positive positioning of Labour within the national discourse. The strong
internationalism of socialist parties across Europe was tied to the manifold
experience of alienation and exclusion from the nation-state. Marxs power-
ful suggestion that workers did not have a fatherland made sense to many of
those to whom such a fatherland was denied by the ruling classes. Yet, of
course, famously, Marxs thinking on the national question was fraught with
contradictions. On the one hand he interpreted nationalism as an instrument
of the ruling classes by which to defeat movements for social emancipation.
On the other, however, he also carefully distinguished between progressive
historical nations and backward nations which had no right to demand an
existence for themselves. Marxs most influential disciple among Second
International Marxists, Karl Kautsky, was always prone to treat the national
question with derision and a good deal of oversimplification. He predicted,
for example, that nations would simply fade away as the internationalization
of capital proceeded and that the different national languages would become
mere dialects.14
Yet, long before the Marxist turn of the SPD at Erfurt in 1891 (primarily
the result of persecution under the Anti-Socialist Law), Ferdinand Lassalle,
founder of the first socialist party in Germany in 1863 and, next to Marx and
Engels, the most influential theoretician of German Social Democracy in the
12 James Hinton, Voluntarism Versus Jacobinism: Labor, Nation and Citizenship in Britain, 1850
1950, International Labor and Working Class History, vol. 48 (1995), pp. 6890.
13 Marcel van der Linden, The National Integration of European Working-Classes (18711914), Inter-
national Review of Social History, vol. 33 (1988), p. 286. I have discussed the many ambiguities of
integration and exclusion of British and German labour at greater length in Stefan Berger, The British
Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900–1931: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1994). See also Stefan Berger, British and German Socialists Between Class and National
Solidarity, in Berger and Smith, eds., Nationalism, pp. 3163.
14 Karl Kautsky, Die moderne Nationalität, Neue Zeit, vol. 5 (1887), p. 541.
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nineteenth century, attempted to merge the Social Democratic and national
agendas. Only if workers were fully integrated into the nation-state as citi-
zens, according to his argument, would they feel loyal to the nation-state. If
they were fully integrated as citizens, then the substitution of a socialist for
the existing capitalist economy would logically follow.15 In the 1890s and
1900s the father of revisionism and self-declared Marxist Eduard Bernstein
argued that identification with the democratic, socially responsible nation-
state was the precondition for any true internationalist friendship.16 These
lines of thought, intertwined, as they were, with the political practice of par-
ticipating in a national political framework, contributed to the willingness of
Social Democrats to interpret the war of 1914 as a war of national defence
and national survival. The SPDs culture and milieu had already been
heavily militarized before 1914. This, after all, was a party in which leading
members carried nicknames such as the General, the Emperor, and the
Red Czar. Party conferences were referred to as army manoeuvres, and
the individual party member became a party soldier.17 In the Weimar
Republic, widely perceived as a Social Democratic creature, democratic
patriotism became almost commonplace among SPD members. Social Dem-
ocratic theorists such as Hermann Heller and Rudolf Hilferding emphasized
the importance of democratic and parliamentary structures for the evolution
of socialism in Germany and attempted to reconcile Social Democrats fur-
ther with the German nation-state. Even the Communist left, which per-
ceived the Communist International as the true fatherland of the working
class, was prone to mobilizing the national question for its own purposes:
hence the Communists drastic denunciations of the Versailles Treaty and
their participation in the struggle against the French occupation of the Ruhr
in 1923. In the interwar period, only the anarchist left firmly rejected nation-
alism as the religion of the modern state.18 However, even anarchists were
infected with the nationalist virus, and some of the  founders of anarchism
sometimes displayed the worst excesses of ethno-nationalism.19
The British Labour Party, of course, never took a Marxist turn, although
several of its leaders had read Marx and were influenced by Marxist think-
ing. As a self-consciously British party, Labour could tag onto a tradition of
radical patriotism ranging back to the late eighteenth century. Hence the
party could and did portray itself as defending the ancient liberties of the
freeborn Englishman. Leading left-wing writers such as H. M. Hyndman,
15 Shlomo Naaman, Lassalle (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschichte, 1970), pp. 377408.
16 Manfred B. Steger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 189197.
17 Günther Hauk, Armeekorps auf dem Weg zur Sonne. Einige Bemerkungen zur kulturellen Selbst-
darstellung der Arbeiterbewegung, in Dietmar Petzina, ed., Fahnen, Fäuste, Körper. Symbolik und
Kultur der Arbeiterbewegung (Essen: Klartext, 1986), pp. 6989.
18 One of the key texts here was Rudolf Rocker, Nationalism and Culture (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1936).
19 Carl Levy, Anarchism and Nationalism in Europe, 18701939 (paper presented at the European
Social Science History Conference, Amsterdam, April 1215, 2000).
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leader of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), and Robert Blatchford,
editor of the influential Clarion newspaper, were not shy to champion the
national idea, and the partys own programmatic statements often reflected
its explicit commitment to the nation-state.20 The two most popular hymns
in the Labour Church movement of the 1890s were God Bless Our Native
Land and God Save the Working Man. Cartoons in the socialist press
often depicted the national saint, St. George, as defender of the poor and the
workers.21 In and immediately after the war, Labours ethno-nationalism
reached unprecedented height. While the German was perceived as twen-
tieth-century Attila, British Labour propagandists produced tomes of con-
fessions of absolute loyalty to Britain.22 In light of all this, Tom Nairn has in
fact argued that the Labour Party, through its Britishness, was one of the few
institutions/ ideologies to paper over the deep cultural, linguistic, and social
differences in the multi-national state.23 Yet it was also on the Celtic fringe
that socialists attempted to fuse socialism with Welsh, Irish, and Scottish
nationalism.24 Even on the small Communist left in Britain, there was often
a vague notion that, in Raphael Samuels words, Communism, though not
intended as such, was a way of being English, a bridge by which the children
of the ghetto entered the national culture.25
Yet this can be at best only one side of the story. After all, Labours think-
ing on nationalism was deeply influenced by the writings of theorists of
imperialism such as J. A. Hobson and Norman Angell. Time and again they
had denounced the new imperialism after 1895, warning in particular of its
illiberal and militarist effects on Britain. Following Angell and Hobson,
British Labourites, just like German Marxists, came to the conclusion that
nationalism was ultimately an ideology of the ruling classes to defeat move-
ments for social emancipation. Hence it is not surprising that, as Paul Addi-
son has noted, the majority of Labour Party supporters behaved like
outsiders in a country that belonged to someone else.26 A Mass Observation
report as late as 1938 came to the conclusion that the majority of workers
were uninterested in national affairs. So-called national crises only regis-
20 Appeal to the Nation (London: The Labour Party, 1923); Labour and the Nation (London: The
Labour Party, 1928).
21 Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881–1924 (Lon-
don: Royal Historical Society, 1998).
22 For several examples, see Friedrich Weckerlein, Streitfall Deutschland. Die britische Linke und die
“Demokratisierung” des Deutschen Reiches, 1900–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1994).
23 The others being royalty, imperialism, and racialism. See, in particular, Tom Nairn, The Enchanted
Glass: Britain and its Monarchy (London: Verso, 1994).
24 David Howell, A Lost Left: Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1986).
25 Raphael Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism, New Left Review, vol. 154 (1985), p. 53.
26 Paul Addison, Britain and the Politics of Social Patriotism, in S. Aster, ed., The Second World War
as National Experience (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War,
1981), p. 48.
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tered with workers if directly linked to things that mattered in their everyday
lives, such as food prices, rents, and employment conditions. The rapid
decline of National Labour in the 1930s and the quick recovery of the
Labour Party demonstrated the limited appeal of left-wing nationalism
among the wider working-class electorate.
For both the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, it
became a particularly vexed question how to position themselves towards
immigrants and national minorities who were often perceived as a direct
threat to national cohesion and unity. Imperial Germany was a labour
importing country where foreigners had no civil rights and were kept as a
dependent and disposable labour force.27 Imperial German governments
became famous for their ruthless Germanization policies which attempted to
destroy any outlets for foreign cultural identities. On one hand immigrants
and national minorities had no better champions than Social Democrats, who
campaigned steadfastly to give foreigners the same rights as Germans and to
adopt more liberal and tolerant policies towards national minorities. On the
other hand, however, German Social Democrats found it very difficult to
accept national ambitions of the Polish, Danish, and Alsatian national minor-
ities within the boundaries of the Reich. The SPD tended to reduce those
national questions to questions of the equality of citizenship within the exist-
ing German nation-state. Perhaps even more importantly, Social Democrats
were also prone to perceive foreigners as difficult to organize and as
strike-breakers who were constantly willing to undercut wages. Hence some
Social Democrats also demanded further restrictions on immigration and the
preferential employment of German workers.
Yet such reactions have also to be set into their proper context, namely the
close interrelationship between ethnic nationalism and what Étienne Balibar
has called the conscious institutional racialisation of manual labour by the
ruling classes: government, the state apparatus, and employers.28 Under the
conditions of capitalist wage labour, the new proletariat became the target of
a new racism in Europe, what Balibar has termed class racism.29 A new
race of labourers was increasingly defined by social scientists and public
administrators by their allegedly hereditary material and spiritual poverty,
their propensity to criminality, congenital vice, dirtiness, sexual promiscuity,
and degeneracy. Richard Evanss masterly social history of Hamburg in the
nineteenth century demonstrates time and again how the German middle
classes felt morally superior to workers and at the same time feared the
workers disregard for their own bourgeois norms and society. In the citys
housing and health reforms after the cholera epidemic of 1892, class racism
27 Martin Forberg, Foreign Labour, the State and Trade Unions in Imperial Germany, 18901918, in
W. R. Lee and Eve Rosenhaft, eds., State, Social Policy and Social Change in Germany, 1880–1994,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Berg, 1997), p. 112.
28 Balibar, Class Racism, p. 210f.
29 Ibid., p. 209.
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played a very important role.30 In late nineteenth-century Britain, notions of
backwardness and decay promoted a more rational organization of the
working-class poor. The physical deterioration of workers was often
expressed in terms of racial degeneracy.31 Social progress began to be dis-
cussed in terms of racial progress or racial decline. The rise of the
eugenics movement in Britain and Germany had its origins in class racist
assumptions and theories. The very bodies of workers were perceived as
fragmented and mutilated, the subject of the violence of machinery that fur-
ther debilitated the workers existence.32 The debilitation was biologized and
became hereditary, which made it necessary to think about ways of ensuring
the health of the nation. Excluded from normal humanity, workers were
also not regarded as worthy of citizenship. In the course of the nineteenth
century, the ruling classes in advanced capitalist countries in Europe and
North America increasingly attempted to remove the label of dangerous
classes from the workers and to de-racialize their discourse on workers.
Instead, the discourse and label were transferred increasingly to immigrants,
foreigners, and colonial subjects.
Yet race and racism, as Balibar also insists, were never just used as tools
of the ruling classes to exclude workers and combat class consciousness
among them. Workers responded to their institutional racialization with self-
racialization. English workers organized around symbols of English ethnic
and national origin against Irishmen, Jews, Blacks, Germans, and all those
who were constructed as different. By the same token, German workers
organized around symbols of German ethnic and national origin against
Poles, Jews, Alsatians, Danes, and other minorities or foreigners. Yet eth-
nicity and race was not the only focus of the workers self-racialization. By
stressing the importance of their class origin and putting the highest value on
manual labour (despising all other forms of labour), they produced various
forms of workerism mainly directed against members of other social
classes. In fact, in this way the signifiers of class racism were turned back
against the middle classes.33 Both workerism and working-class racism
hence had their deeper roots in the self-racialization of the working class.
For good reasons workers came to perceive themselves as a closed body. It
helped them to preserve gains that had been won in the past. It maintained
the cohesion of their organizations and the traditions of their struggles. In
practice, workerism and working-class racism were often closely inter-
linked. Thus the uprising of Welsh miners and transport workers in 1910
1911 was not only directed against employers but was accompanied by
30 Richard J. Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830–1910 (London:
Penguin, 1987).
31 Jose Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: A Social History of Britain, 1870–1914 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), especially pp. 230244.
32 Balibar, Class Racism, p. 211.
33 Ibid., p. 213.
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fierce attacks on Chinese laundries and Jewish shops. The unmitigated hos-
tility of the SPDs main daily newspaper, Vorwärts, against the capitalist sys-
tem was accompanied by occasional outbursts against Russian garbage
cossacks and uncleanly Pollacks.
During the 1920s employers in the German shipping industry consciously
replaced Germans with foreign workers because the latter were less expen-
sive and less militant. As Hartmut Rübner has demonstrated, the Social
Democratic unions failed to see this connection and instead chose to adopt
the racialist discourse. They reappropriated the language of race to fight job
insecurity, increasing health risks, declining real wages, and deteriorating
union membership. Recourse to the national interest thus made unions col-
lude with employers in the segmentation of the work force along national/
racial lines.34 There are illuminating comparisons to be made with the Brit-
ish shipping industry in the interwar period. British employers, like their
German counterparts, employed a number of racist strategies and con-
structed racial differences in order to lower wages. The British National
Union of Seamen, again like their German counterparts, failed to expose
these practices. Instead the union colluded with employers and, as Laura
Tabili has shown, introduced a racist discourse to maintain established wage
hierarchies, prevent any rank-and-file radicalization, and strengthen the
unions position vis-à-vis the employers.35
Equally striking similarities are revealed by a comparison of the attitudes
of the Lanarkshire Miners Union and the Alte Verband (the Social Demo-
cratic miners union founded in 1889) in the Ruhr towards Polish and
Lithuanian-speaking workers before 1914. In Scotland and the Ruhr the self-
perception of the indigenous miners as independent colliers prevented sol-
idarity with the unskilled immigrant. Furthermore, the language problem,
debates about higher accident rates due to the employment of foreigners, and
complaints about their alleged uncleanliness, drunkenness, and taste for
fighting all proved important barriers to any smooth integration of these
migrants into their host societies. Yet, ultimately, the Scottish unions could
mobilize and integrate the immigrants, while the Alte Verband could not.
The latter soon faced a rival in an independent Polish union organization,
which was by no means less militant but retained a fierce independence from
its German counterparts. There are many reasons for this: the number of
migrants into the Scottish coalfield was in the hundreds; in the Ruhr it was in
the hundreds of thousands. The German union movement was already
divided according to different ideologies, whereas the British union move-
34 Hartmut Rübner, Lebens-, Arbeits- und gewerkschaftliche Organisationsbedingungen chinesischer
Seeleute in der deutschen Handelsflotte. Der maritme Aspekt der Ausländerbeschäftigung vom Kai-
serreich bis in den NS-Staat, Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, vol. 33, no. 1 (1997), pp. 141.
35 Laura Tabili, “We Ask for British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
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ment was not. But perhaps the most important reason for the different suc-
cess rate of indigenous Scottish and German unions in organizing the
migrants lay with the different reaction of the state. After all, the ruthless
Germanization policies of the Imperial German state simply had no equiva-
lent in Britain.36
Britain in fact had a long tradition of comparatively liberal immigration
laws. Yet in the first decade of the twentieth century things began to change.
Mechanisms of exclusion began to be introduced which were aimed at dis-
criminating against foreigners and immigrants, the other against whom the
indigenous worker could be positively contrasted. A wave of Russian Jewish
immigration served as reason for the government to introduce an Aliens Act
in 1905. The act was extended both in 1914 and 1918. The 1908 Pensions
Act for the first time introduced pensions for citizens over 70. They were
means-tested. Persons with a criminal conviction and those on poor relief
were excluded (the latter until 1911), and initially even a reference of good
character was required before any payments could be made. Furthermore,
only a person who for at least twenty years ... has been a British subject,
and has had his residence ... in the United Kingdom qualified for a British
pension.37 Such disqualification of foreigners had no parallel in the first Ger-
man pensions law of 1889. However, German pensions, unlike British ones,
were not financed out of central taxation. Workers and employers alike paid
contributions that entitled them to a pension. The size of their pension
depended on the payments made from their wages.38
Officially the Labour Party always argued against restricting immigration.
Many Labour leaders believed firmly that Britain had to remain the home
of freedom. However, at the same time they also widely perceived foreign
immigrants as potential blacklegs and wage-cutters who would be difficult
to organize in the labour movement. Hence the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) passed several resolutions hostile to immigration in the 1890s and
1900s, and two of the most committed internationalists of the Labour Party,
Bruce Glasier and Keir Hardie, found themselves arguing against further
immigration into Britain at about the same time. Glasier, like many others,
clearly felt threatened by images of uncontrollable waves of wild foreigners
descending on Britain's shores: neither the principle of the brotherhood of
man nor the principle of social equality implies that brother nations or
brother men may crowd upon us in such numbers as to abuse our hospitality,
36 Kenneth Lunn, Reactions to Lithuanian and Polish Immigrants in the Lanarkshire Coalfield, 1880
1914, in Lunn, ed., Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities: Historical Responses to Newcomers in British
Society, 1870–1914 (Folkestone: Dawson, 1980), pp. 308342; on the Ruhr, see John Kulczycki, The
Foreign Worker and the German Labour Movement: Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of
the Ruhr, 1870–1914 (Oxford: Berg, 1994).
37 Public General Statutes, no. 8 (London: HMSO, 1908), chap. 40, p. 176.
38 I am grateful to Peter Hennock for pointing this out to me. For the details of the German act, see Erich
von Woedtke, Das Reichsgesetz, betreffend die Invaliditäts- und Alterversicherung, vom 22. Juni
1889, 4th ed. (Berlin: J. Guttentag, 1889).
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overturn our institutions or violate our customs.39 Cities with large-scale
Jewish immigration witnessed high levels of working-class anti-semitism in
the early twentieth century,40 and few Labour leaders were bold enough to
envisage class solidarity between black and white workers. Ben Tillett, the
British dockworkers leader, conceded that both suffered from capitalist
exploitation, but he was adamant that there could be no comradeship
between these two sets of slaves; for ever the black is black  and the white
is white.41
In Britain and Germany alike, the labour movements opposition to immi-
gration and its pandering to ethno-nationalist sentiments were particularly
strong, where indigenous workers felt directly threatened by foreign com-
petition. Examples are provided by the British boot and shoe operatives, tai-
lors, and furniture makers, as well as clerks who turned on German
immigrants in the 1880s and 1890s. In Germany the perfect example would
be the building trade, where time and again German workers were dismissed
and replaced by foreigners. The sole reference to job competition, however,
cannot adequately explain the attractions of ethnic and racial identities for
workers. As David Roediger has shown for the United States, issues of race
are not reducible to issues of class. The construction by workers of white-
ness and its other, namely black, was a response to the imposition of a
new work ethos by the new capitalist economy and to a sense of dependency
on wage labour. A post-revolutionary and strongly republican white working
class in the making was at the same time based on the racist exclusion of
blacks as unfit for citizenship. Class and race policies went hand in hand to
produce demands for inclusion into the nation-state by white workers and to
produce barriers against the inclusion of blacks.42 Historians of the European
working class would do well to take those insights on board and to ask, more
than they have done so far, what workers had to gain by actively construct-
ing themselves as members of a more privileged race. Working-class agency
in racism remains an important topic for labour studies.
On the whole, as I hope I have demonstrated, only a minority on the Brit-
ish and German left saw any clear-cut dichotomy between the concepts of
class and nation. Labour leaders in both countries often perceived them-
selves as heirs to a progressive liberal nationalism which allegedly had been
betrayed by its erstwhile champions, the liberal middle classes. While the
latter had become the main propagators of various illiberal state and integral
nationalisms, Labour in Britain, and arguably even more so in Germany,
39 Cited in Joanna Bourke, Working Class Cultures in Britain, 1890–1960 (London: Routledge, 1994),
p. 196.
40 A. Lee, Aspects of the Working Class Response to the Jews in Britain, 18801914, in Lunn, ed.,
Hosts, p. 118.
41 Logie Barrow, White Solidarity in 1914, in Raphael Samuel, ed., Patriotism: The Making and
Unmaking of British National Identity (London: Routledge, 1989), vol. 1, p. 281.
42 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class
(London: Verso, 1991).
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came to construct alternative notions of national belonging that tended to be
closely intertwined with class identities. A brief comparison of Britain and
Germany suggests that it is too simplistic to juxtapose notions of a non-
socialist labour movement in Britain, which did not espouse strong class
identities and therefore found it easier to appropriate existing constructions
of the nation-state, with notions of an orthodox Marxist movement in Ger-
many, excluded and alienated from the Imperial German state and therefore
anti-national in its orientation. Instead the comparison shows a perplexing
web of exclusionary and inclusionary mechanisms at work in both countries.
Strong forms of institutionalized anti-socialism stood next to Labours com-
mitment to a national welfare state; the unfair treatment of Labour by the
law courts and the police stood next to its firm belief in parliamentarism and
the rule of law. Such ambiguities were reflected in the theoretical approaches
of the Social Democratic left towards the nation-state: in Germany the fluid-
ity of Marxs thinking about the nation increasingly gave way to a more pos-
itive endorsement of the national idea in Lassalle and Bernstein. Labour in
Britain could adapt to a tradition of radical left-wing patriotism, yet this did
not prevent the widespread alienation of Labour from official variants of
nationalism. British and German Labours forever shifting attempts to buy
into aspects of a diverse and bewildering range of national identities pro-
duced particularly vexed contradictions when it came to their positioning
vis-à-vis immigrants, national minorities, and foreigners. Championing the
latters civil rights on one hand, Labour leaders and their working-class con-
stituency on the other hand also shared in the racialist discourse which came
to dominate attitudes towards those groups around the turn of the century.
Class and race identities increasingly became inseparable in Labours
response to both the racialization of the immigrant/ foreigner and the racial-
ization of manual labour. In the nineteenth century, Britain and Germany
witnessed acute forms of class racism that accompanied the rise of ethnic
nationalism. Appeals to workers to organize around ethno-national identities
resulted in a self-racialization of the working class, which could be directed
against the ethnic other as well as against the social other. In the com-
plex interlinkage between class and race the question of agency is crucial:
what did workers and their representatives hope to gain by playing the race
card? The majority tried in their very different ways to combine class, eth-
nic, and national identities. In the end, at least up until the outbreak of the
Second World War, both the British and the German labour movements
ended up somewhere between class and nation, incapable of neatly distin-
guishing between a good left-wing patriotism and a bad right-wing national-
ism and unable to ensure any smooth acceptance of Labour into the existing
nation-state. Only under the conditions of war and the emerging West Euro-
pean Pax Americana thereafter did things begin to change.
